PIA's decline attributed to mismanagement and cultural stagnation
Once, Pakistan International Airlines symbolized national ambition. Its
aircraft carried the country’s flag across continents, its service earned
international respect, and its engineering and maintenance facilities were
regarded as among the best in the region. Today, PIA stands as a cautionary
tale of how structural rigidity, cultural inertia, and managerial failure can
hollow out even the most prestigious public institutions. Mohammad
Nafees in a piece in Friday Times details the factors that contributed to
decline of the national carrier of Pakistan.
My years working with a company that provided
technical support to PIA offered a close view of this decline. The problem was
never just debt or temporary financial stress. It was an organization frozen in
its own history, unable—or unwilling—to adapt.
PIA had built an extraordinary in-house
maintenance ecosystem. It operated an engine overhaul shop capable of handling
dozens of wide-body engines each year, alongside component, pneumatic,
landing-gear, and instrument shops, plus multiple structural overhaul
facilities. A fully equipped engine test bench existed to certify wide-body engines
after overhaul. Consistent with its long-standing philosophy of self-reliance,
PIA also constructed the massive Ispahani Hangar, capable of performing all
categories of heavy aircraft checks. Alongside the Fokker Hangar and the Block
Hangar, this gave the airline one of the most comprehensive technical
infrastructures in South Asia.
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In theory, such capacity should have ensured
operational resilience. In practice, it became a burden. Despite this
infrastructure, PIA continued to send certain engine work abroad. Its A310
fleet, powered by CF6-80C2 engines, and its Boeing 747s, equipped with
Rolls-Royce RB211 engines, required overseas overhauls because PIA lacked specialized
tooling and the necessary FAA certifications. Even the engine test bench needed
upgrades before overhauled engines could be properly cleared for service.
Rather than recognizing that modern airlines
often combine in-house capability with selective outsourcing, PIA management
clung to the belief that everything must be done internally. Facilities were
retained not because they made economic sense, but because they preserved jobs
and simplified administration. What once represented technical strength
gradually turned into structural excess.
As the fleet modernized—most notably with the
induction of the Boeing 777—and older aircraft such as the A310, 747, and 737
neared retirement, PIA failed to plan for redundancy. Instead of rationalizing
infrastructure, management pursued General Electric to upgrade the engine test
bench under an offset programme linked to the Boeing 777 purchase. GE proposed
an upgrade costing around $8 million for the CF6-80C2 engines. PIA, however,
insisted on making the bench compatible with the GE90 engines used on the 777—a
move that would have required nearly double the investment.
The proposal made little commercial sense. The
GE90 fleet required only a handful of shop visits each year, rendering such an
investment unjustifiable. GE declined and proceeded with the CF6-80C2 upgrade
instead, while also supplying roughly $2.5 million worth of tooling to support
PIA’s engine overhaul shop. Management believed this would attract foreign
customers to PIA’s facilities. That expectation never materialized. Within a
few years, the A310s were phased out, followed by other legacy aircraft,
leaving behind infrastructure designed for fleets that no longer existed.
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What followed was predictable. Idle facilities
continued to incur rent payable to the Civil Aviation Authority, while surplus
staff remained on payroll. PIA’s employee-to-aircraft ratio ballooned far
beyond international norms. A strategic asset had become a chronic liability.
As losses mounted—especially from the early
2020s onward—a culture of blame replaced analysis. Administration accused
engineering of excessive spending; engineering blamed administration for
corruption and incompetence. Yet no serious financial or operational review was
undertaken to identify which functions added value and which drained resources.
The deeper failure was cultural. Throughout my
time there, I saw little meaningful engagement between management and staff: no
shared vision, no structured dialogue, no training forums, no encouragement of
innovation. The airline functioned on inherited routines while global aviation
transformed around it. Employees were disconnected from strategy, managers
resisted change, and performance went largely unmeasured. Those who questioned
this inertia were often sidelined rather than empowered.
PIA is not an isolated case. Pakistan Steel
Mills collapsed after failing to modernize. Pakistan Railways maintains
sprawling workshops and excess staff even as passengers abandon rail travel.
The Pakistan National Shipping Corporation missed the shift to containerisation
and modern logistics. These enterprises share the same underlying DNA:
politicised management, obsolete infrastructure, and resistance to reform.
The contrast with Pakistan’s defence industry
is striking. Despite facing similar national constraints, defence enterprises
have remained adaptive, investing in technology, enforcing accountability, and
planning strategically. The difference is not talent or nationality, but
organisational culture—discipline, merit, and long-term thinking.
Beyond aviation, PIA’s story mirrors the
broader condition of public administration in Pakistan. Corruption,
mismanagement, and institutional inertia undermine performance across sectors.
Pakistan Railways now carries pension liabilities exceeding its operating
revenue. Circular debt in the energy sector grows unchecked, much like PIA’s
redundant workshops once did. In each case, liabilities accumulate while reform
is endlessly postponed.
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The privatization of PIA risks becoming less a
reform than an admission of failure: a way for the state to shed responsibility
without confronting the structural flaws that caused the collapse. Selling off
a broken institution may ease fiscal pressure, but it also postpones the harder
task of rebuilding governance, incentives, and accountability.
Unless
Pakistan undertakes that deeper reform, PIA will remain more than a fallen
airline. It will serve as a template—repeated across railways, steel, shipping,
and energy—of how national pride erodes when institutions stop learning,
adapting, and holding themselves to account.
Source: Friday Times